From Russia with Love: South Korea's experience with Russian weapons

From late 90s to mid 2000s, South Korea received significant number of Russian military equipment as result of the "Brown Bear Project (불곰사업)," in which Russia paid back debts incurred during the Soviet era with its latest weapon systems. Included in this deal were around 35 T-80U main battle tanks, 70 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, 3 Murena-class LCAC, 60 KA-32 helicopters, 23 Il-103 trainer aircraft, METIS-M anti-tank guided missiles, IGLA man-portable air-defense system, and key technology transfers. While these Russian equipment have served the ROK Armed Forces admirably since their introduction, they are beginning to cause issues that ROK Armed Forces has not experienced in US or domestically-produced systems.

T-80U in South Korean service. Note the combat idenfication panel installed onthe turret's side.

Photo Credit: Defense Media Agency

Maintenance Nightmare

The military is said to be burdened by "frequent mechanical failures and rising price of spare parts" of Russian weapon systems. According to this report submitted by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly, in a three-year period from 2010 to 2013, Russian-made equipment in service with the Armed Forces had suffered 1,941 cases of mechanical failure and cost 16.17 billion won ($14.36 million) in maintenance.

Particular weapon system that suffered the most problem were BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, which suffered record 1,539 cases of mechanical failure, 85 of which occurred in the span of mere 10 days. T-80U main battle tanks and Murena-class LCACs suffered from 382 and 20 cases of mechanical failures, respectively.

Meanwhile, cost of spare parts for these weapon systems have almost tripled between 1996 and 2006. For example, cost of T-80U's crosswind sensor rose 2.75 times its original price and BMP-3's engine by 2.66 times its original price. 

BMP-3 in South Korean service. It was the only type of infantry fighting vehicle in service with ROK Armed Forces until the introduction of K21.

Photo Credit: Chosun Ilbo

Korea Coast Guard faces similar problem with its fleet of KA-32 helicopters, around 60 of which are in service with the Air Force and various civilian agencies throughout the country. Russian helicopters suffer from long maintenance period caused by slow delivery of spare parts. Coat Guard spokesman said total maintenance period of Rusisan helicopters are often three times longer than those of US or European-made helicopters that are operated by the KCG.

KA-32T Helix-C in Korea Coast Guard service.

It's equipped with BAE Systems AN/APX-118(V) common transponders interfaced with mission computer produced by IAI.

Photo Credit: Defense Media Agency

The reason for slow delivery of spare parts seems to be due to Russian manufacturer's inability to produce and stock enough spare parts to meet the demands of its customers. In 2016, Russia offered to buy back T-80U and BMP-3 so it could provide them as spare parts to friendly nations that are already operating them, such as Cyprus and Yemen.

Interoperability

South Korea has been very satisfied with performance of Russian-made weapon systems, but merely two decades after the iniitial introduction, they are not being operated at optimal operational readiness due to lack of interoperability with existing systems. The issue rises from the fact that, apart from frequent mechanical failures, Russian-made weapon systems are downright incompatible with existing NATO-standard equipment operated by the ROK Armed Forces. Difficulty in acquiring spare parts and ammunition are major hurdles when it comes to operating Russian weapon systems, especially when compared to the ease and speed at which spare parts and ammunitions can be acquired for American or domestic counterparts. South Korea has tried to remedy some of these issues by installing domestic communication equipment and combat identification panels on Russian armored vehicles and even localizing some of the spare parts, but these efforts don't seem to be enough. 

South Korea is currently stuck in a limbo in regards to the fate of these Russian-made weapon systems. For example, T-80U and BMP-3 were planned to be retired from 2018 to 2022. However, due to lack of immediate replacement for these systems, their retirement has been indefinitely postponed. Units which operate Russian equipment are forced to keep operating them despite the severe shortage of ammunition and spare parts. They will be burdened with high maintenance period and cost for the foreseeable future, ultimately affecting their mission readiness.

Due to the "inherently poor durability of Russian-made equipment," units which operate them are forced to replace entire components rather than fixing them. If this kind of maintenance method is to continue, South Korea needs a guaranteed delivery of spare parts from the Russia, which has been very unreliable thus far.

Murena-class LCAC in South Korean service.

Photo Credit: bemil.chosun.com

There is no doubt that despite issues that currently plague Russian-made equipment, they have been very beneficial to South Korea; they served their purpose and they served it well. Not only was South Korea able to gain access to the latest and non-downgraded Russian equipment, it also gained a wealth of doctrinal knowledge and key technology that influenced domestic research and development.

One must remember, however, that South Korea's case was highly unique. When the Brown Bear project was ongoing, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was in economic and social turmoil. There has not been an instant since where Russia willingly provided the latest model of its military equipment and sensitive military technology to a US-aligned nation.

Key military technology acquired from the Brown Bear Project influenced number of domestic research & development projects, such as Cheongung medium-range surface-to-air missile (pictured), K2 Black Panther main battle tank, K21 infantry fighting vehicle, SSM-700K C-Star anti-ship missiles, and more.

Photo Credit: Newsis

In the end, Russian-made equipment ultimately became a burden to South Korea's logistic chain. South Korea is able to maintain much older domestic and US-made equipment at a significantly higher availability rate than Russian ones. For example, K1 main battle tanks, introduced in the 80s, are planned to be operated well into 2040s with constant upgrades. All US and domestic armored vehicles go through complete overhaul every 12~15 years at the army logistic command, something that doesn't apply to Russian-made vehicles. Despite being beneficial while they lasted, Russian-made equipment will most likely be remembered as a double-edged sword.